# The 'Identity Doesn't Matter to Morality' View: Unconditional Third-Person Ascription of Personhood in Kant and Wittgenstein[*]

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**Abstract:** In this paper we are going first to expose certain theories of conditional recognition of personal identity, from Locke's relational account of identity to Parfit's identity-doesn't-matter-to-survival view. In the second part we will focus on philosophical conceptions of unconditional ascription of personhood to others, examining especially Kant and Wittgenstein's references on that matter which both seem to face skepticism of other persons as redundant. That kind of skepticism is a greater scandal for philosophy than objects' skepticism as Stanley Cavell puts it. We will conclude with Kant and Wittgenstein's respective views based on their scarce references, labelled together as identity-doesn't-matter-to-morality view. This unconditional acceptance of the third-person ascription of personhood to others as intentional objects of our moral concerns, will satisfy our common beliefs and practices, while recognizing others' personhood as a brute fact.
**Keywords:** other minds; personal identity; identity doesn't matter view; brute fact; Kant; Wittgenstein.

> Thus the persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself.
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> Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*

> My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul. The human body is the best picture of the human soul.
>
> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*

The philosophical discourse on personhood pertaining mainly to the first-person recognition of personal identity attempts to determine the conditions under which someone recognizes himself as identical through time and is thus morally and legally responsible for his own acts as a person. The third-person recognition of the other person in the modern context of other minds problem, is not encountered as such by ancient Greek philosophy. That problem appears in the context of the orthodox empiricist conception of personal identity and renders the gap between first and third-person ascriptions of mental states unbridgeable and the consequent difficulty to ascribe moral duties between the self and the others (who can be automata or Martians or dummies) insuperable. Patricia Kitcher says that in the case of other minds, we must make a dubious inference to assert than anyone else even has a mind, whereas, in our own case, the ascription of mental states is "immune to error," or at least "immune to error through misidentification."[1] There are several bioethical implications of the third-person recognition of other persons problem. How can we ascribe personhood and moral status to others when they may be comatose, demented, unable to communicate any information or terminally ill patients represented by a proxy or by advance directives, etc.? In the first part of this paper, we are going to expound certain theories of *conditional recognition of personal identity*, either by first-person's standpoint (Locke's *relational* view and late Parfit's

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[1] Patricia Kitcher, "On Interpreting Kant's Thinker as Wittgenstein's 'I,'" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* LXI, no. 1 (2000): 48-49.

*identity doesn't matter* view) or by self-*narrative criteria of personal identity* (Frankfurt, Dworkin, and MacIntyre's views) as also by third-person's standpoint community orientated criteria (Schechtman's *anthropological* view and Rorty's *relativistic* view). In the second part, we will go on investigating philosophical conceptions of *the unconditional ascription of personhood to others*, examining some scarce references in Kant and Wittgenstein.[2] In concluding, we will ascribe an alleged similar view to Kant and Wittgenstein, as *identity-doesn't-matter-to-morality* view. This view, facing recognition of the other human as a brute fact[3] is tuned with our common beliefs and practices and bestows personhood to others without empirical conditions.

## I. Conditional recognition of personal identity. From Locke's *relational account of identity* to Parfit's *identity-doesn't-matter-to-survival* view

There are several theories of conditional recognition of personal identity. We will place them here in three groups: the *relational account of identity* and the *self-narrative or self-constructed criterion of personal identity* which are both first-person views on identity, and finally third-person views which demand certain

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[2] Kant and Wittgenstein made claims about the "unknowability" of cognitive subjects and there is a vast bibliography connecting their claims in the context of the 'unknowability of the subject of thought.' Henry Allison, John McDowell, Gareth Evans, Jonathan Hacker, John McDowell, Quassim Cassam, Ralph C. S. Walker, T. E. Wilkerson are included by Patricia Kitcher in this influential tradition assimilating Kant's position on the thinking subject to Wittgenstein's 'I' (Ibid., 33-35). Here we are going to investigate the narrower space of their views on third-person recognition of other persons or souls.

[3] In contemporary philosophy, a brute fact is a fact that has no explanation; see G. E. M. Anscombe, "On Brute Facts," *Analysis* 18, no. 3 (1958): 69-72. Also Barry Smith, and John Searle, "The Construction of Social Reality: An Exchange," *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 62, no. 1 (2003): 285-309, where Searle developed Anscombe's concept of brute facts distinguishing between physical facts and social or institutional facts.

conditions for the identification of personhood (the *relativistic* and the *anthropological view*).

Locke's criterion of the *relational account of identity* is the first attempt to render identity a *forensic term* with a broader moral echo with normative implications. According to Locke, person as a forensic term is "appropriating actions and their merit; and so belongs only to intelligent agents capable of a law, and happiness, and misery."[4] His conception of personal identity is exclusively recognized by one's self-reflection, if her consciousness "can be extended backwards"[5] by remembering her thoughts and experiences, being dependent on certain relations through time, which is the reason it is called *relational account of identity.* That conception triggers by its structure quasi-science fiction mental experiments, like the resurrection hypothesis by Locke himself[6] or the *fission problem* structured by Derek Parfit in contemporary philosophy.[7] We call the *relational account of identity* "the orthodox approach."

Parfit, in the context of *Psychological View of personal identity* which comes straight down from Locke's relational account,

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[4] John Locke, "Of Identity and Diversity," in *Personal Identity*, ed. John Perry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 50-51.

[5] Ibid., 39.

[6] In case of resurrection, I will be someone to whom my present consciousness extends so this resurrected person will be me even though he might have a different body than I have now (Ibid., 44) This conception is dualistic, rendering the human body unimportant for self-identity. Locke says that if I cut my little finger and my consciousness adhered to it, "that would be the same self which was concerned for the whole body yesterday, as making part of itself, whose actions then it cannot but admit as its own now" (Ibid., 46).

[7] Parfit uses a thought-experiment echoing Locke's severed finger, called *fission.* According to this, I donate each one of my identical triplet brothers one of my functional duplicates brain hemispheres because their brains have been irreversibly damaged. What has happened to me? Have I survived? Are my brothers both me? Can they be identical persons? etc.; see Derek Parfit, *Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 254-255.

introduces q memories that do not presuppose identity, as a solution to Joseph Butler's objection to Locke.[8] By q memories,[9] Parfit wants to establish a strong psychological connectedness, consisting of overlapping chains of significant numbers of direct psychological connections like memories, intentions, beliefs/goals/desires.[10] Parfit is a reductionist considering that the facts about persons correspond to physical facts about the body the brains and mental events.[11] We will come again to late Parfit's view in this paper, as it evolved in *the identity- doesn't -matter- view*.

The second influential group of theories is grounded on the *self-narrative criterion of personal identity*. We could put together here Harry Frankfurt, Ronald Dworkin, Alasdair Mac Intyre, all adopting some way the equation of personal identity with self-story telling. The moral agent creates or possesses an inner *Bildungsroman* unifying temporally, morally, and legally her moral life with coherence and intelligibility that it could not have otherwise.

In "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person" Harry Frankfurt declares that "one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will" but humans are not alone in making choices and other species "even appear to engage in deliberation and to make decisions based upon prior thought." What is different between them is that "humans are able to form what I shall call 'second-order desires' or 'desires of the second-order.'"[12] This Frankfurt's early view has evolved in a later "essential character

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[8] Butler claimed that memory presupposes identity so memory just reveals to me my identity relation to some past experience and cannot constitute that relation. In David Shoemaker, "Personal Identity and Ethics," in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,* ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2019 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/.

[9] Parfit, *Reasons*, 207.

[10] Shoemaker, "Personal Identity," 5.

[11] Parfit, *Reasons*, 210-211.

[12] Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," *The Journal of Philosophy* 68 (1971): 6.

view" according to which "motives are internal to the self when they are essential to the subject's volitional nature" and "a person acts autonomously only when his volitions derive from his essential character."[13] David Velleman, criticizing Frankfurt, says that his conception of self is appealing because of his *idealization* of the way we are that makes it like the way we wish we could be. The motives moving that self are irresistible, and "are in concert rather than in conflict" so the self "will not be divided against itself". Frankfurt believes "that the well-constituted self is wholehearted rather than ambivalent."[14]

Ronald Dworkin's 'integrity view' echoes Harry Frankfurt's authenticity view with a strong element of self-narrative too. According to Dworkin, integrity view "recognizes that people often make choices that reflect weakness, indecision, caprice, or plain irrationality" and that any plausible integrity-based theory of autonomy must recognize its consequences for a particular person on a particular occasion.

> Autonomy encourages and protects people's general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to and for them. Perhaps one principal value of that capacity is realized only when a life does in fact display a general, overall integrity and authenticity.[15]

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[13] Harry Frankfurt, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love," in *Necessity, Volition, and Love* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 132. Frankfurt though differentiates his conception of autonomy by Kantian autonomy which he thinks is impersonal as an expression of 'pure will.' Its commands "are issued by no one in particular" (ibid.). The volitions he renders important for self-identity or "authenticity" are not tied to a law-like universal moral law, they just need to have a perfectly idiosyncratic character. "Even though a person's interests are contingent they can belong to the essential nature of his will" (ibid.,135).

[14] David Velleman, "Identification and Identity," In his *Self to Self Selected Essays* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 341.

[15] Ronald Dworkin, *Life's Dominion: An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993), 224.

Contingent values without any demand for universal or even communal acceptance are established as the material of a self-constructed personal identity deserving respect of her autonomy, while a severely incapacitated person has "presumably lost the capacity that it is the point of autonomy to protect" so "recognizing a continuing right to autonomy for [them] would be pointless."[16] This approach to personhood becomes somehow relational too because it yields integrity (as a presupposition of autonomy) under certain relations between persons and certain capacities they have.

Midway between the views already mentioned and the unconditional third-person recognition of other persons in Kant and Wittgenstein that we are going to investigate in the second part, we meet the relativistic (the question of what it is to be a human being doesn't matter) or the anthropological view (relation between our practical concerns and personal identity). They share a third-person view of the person, but they put it under the scrutiny of empirical conditions that regulate interpersonal relations according to each view.

According to Richard Rorty, we should be better off if we ceased even to ask the philosophical question of what it is to be a human being, echoing the "identity doesn't matter' thesis of late Parfit. Our concern with the needs and the fate of others rests on the imaginative capacity for identification with them which is dependent on facts historically developed differently in different communities. It is not the Humean qualities of human-animal implanted in us by nature, but a moral concern as members of communities within which our way of communicating and linguistic use of 'we' and 'us' create this special community-dependent concern for others.[17] He recognizes the tension between poetry and philosophy as "a tension between an effort to achieve self-creation by the recognition of contingency and an effort to achieve universality

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[16] Ibid., 225.

[17] Cora Diamond, "The Importance of Being Human," *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 29 (1991): 39.

by the transcendence of contingency."[18] Rorty sides with the poets' side towards a permanent indeterminacy of the question about what it is to be a human being. The priests, the philosophers, the empirical scientists, tried to answer that question making the same claim. "They were going to inform us what we really are, what we are compelled to be by powers, not ourselves. They would exhibit the stamp which had been pressed on *all* of us."[19] These are conceivings we don't need. Facing a person of another community far different than ours or somebody linguistically unable to communicate with 'us' like an incapacitated person, we cannot say she is human. Rorty accepts a third-person recognition of other human beings in the context of the same linguistic game, leaving all other possibilities of human interaction in the dark. Cora Diamond says that

> despite the differences between Rorty and the Orthodox [meaning empiricists like Peter Singer who devalue mentally retarded], he is in an interesting way *with* them; both he and they fail to give an adequate account of possibilities of moral responsiveness to the retarded because both he and they, though for different reasons, will not attach to being human *the significance that it has in much moral thought* [our emphasis here].[20]

The so-called *anthropological* view introduced by Marya Schechtman recognizes capacities like Lockean ones together with the capacities we acquire as members of communities and families, during a process that keeps going through our lives, participating so in the unity of the persons we are. Schechtman's view is as community-dependent as Rorty's but she will defend

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[18] Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 25.

[19] Ibid., 26.

[20] Diamond, "The Importance," 53.

incapacitated persons by saying "in real-world the vegetative individual in the hospital bed is Father, who worked hard his whole life and traveled the world before he took ill." This is a third-person life-narrative, which, like all other narratives, presupposes a Lockean person whom the storyteller-society can watch acting throughout life, even if now that she is disabled her story continues as a sequel of her Lockean life. In attempting to justify our common beliefs in a philosophical context, this view also fails to offer a robust normative ground for the concept of person.

We will, at last, examine late Parfit's views that will drive us to the next section. Parfit remains a reductionist in *Reasons and Persons* (1984), but in the "The Unimportance of Identity" (1995) he claims that except being a reductionist he also is a "realist about importance" and from that he concludes that "personal identity is not what matters."[21] Late Parfit claims that "most of us believe that we should care about our future because it will be our future. I believe that what matters is not identity but certain other relations."[22] In this context, he distinguishes between the "Argument from below" expressed as: "personal identity cannot be rationally or morally important. What matters can only be one or more of the other facts in which personal identity consists"[23] and the "Argument from above" according to which: "even if the lower-level facts do not themselves matter, the higher-level fact may matter… the lower level facts have a derived significance."[24] This distinction has strong moral implications. According to late Parfit, probably I won't survive fission, but it is as if I will have survived. Although Parfit refers to the rational and moral unimportance of personal identity he focuses especially on survival. We can call this the *identity-doesn't-matter-to-survival*-view.[25]

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[21] Derek Parfit, "The Unimportance of Identity," in *Identity*, ed. Henry Harris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 33.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid., 29.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Shoemaker, "Personal Identity," 9.

All of the mentioned above approaches of personal identity, whether relational or self-narrative or relativistic or even anthropological, are reductive. They reduce the strongly normative concept of the human person to empirical facts like mental capacities, desires, memories, traits, ways of life, choices, linguistic games, interpersonal relations, etc. leading to empirical contingency, while the quest for strong normativity needs unconditional universality. Being reductive on qualified conditions they face the accusation of *idealization* as Velleman puts it.[26] Each one of them requires special conditions that cannot be met by everyone when 'met by everyone' is a central moral quest for the normative role of the concept of person, taking into account that the respect of the dignity of persons is the cornerstone of most democratic states' constitutions. Onora O'Neill, talking about idealization in moral philosophy, believes that certain contemporary moral theories like 'abstract liberalism' (whether 'deontological' or utilitarian), handle certain issues badly not because of abstraction but because they almost always idealize specific conceptions of the human agent that are admired and feasible in certain privileged circumstances. "Genuine abstraction, without idealization, is, however, the route rather than the obstacle to broad scope."[27] She concludes that "idealization masquerading as abstraction produces theories that appear to apply widely, but which covertly exclude those who do not match a certain ideal or match it less well than others. Those who are excluded are then seen as defective or inadequate."[28]

Another accusation that all these views face, is that of *skepticism*. Kant who was fighting skepticism of the outer world, which in his opinion "remains a scandal of philosophy and universal human reason" (*CPR* XXXIX),[29] didn't face the

[26] Velleman, "Identification," 341.

[27] Onora O'Neill, "Justice, Gender, and International Boundaries," In *Quality of Life*, eds. Martha Nussbaum, and Amartya Sen (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 304.

[28] Ibid., 309.

[29] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* ed. and trans. Paul Guyer, and

skepticism of other minds (a philosophical discourse which didn't exist yet) which he would probably also condemn as a scandal. Ancient skeptics did not extend their *investigation* (σκέψις) in issues like other persons' mind. Their investigation does not meet modern skepticism on that matter. They discuss nothing for this problem while they make the distinction between affections of the mind and affections of the world.[30] Ancient skeptics should probably have discarded empiricist quantifications of conditions demanded by the concept of the person as *dogmatism* and would put them under the test of the *sorites paradox*.[31]

Parfit, after adopting his *identity doesn't matter to survival* thesis, argues for a diachronic personal identity as a special case of psychologically based survival, using sorites-like arguments.[32] What he attempts is to shake the trust in personal identity's determination by criteria of physical continuity or psychological continuity, or a combination of the two (i.e. his early thesis).[33]

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Allen Wood (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 121.

[30] J. Warren, "Precursors of Pyrrhonism: Diog. Laert. 9.67–73," in *Pyrrhonian Skepticism in Diogenes Laertius,* ed. K. Vogt (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck GmbH and KG, 2015), 105-121.

[31] The sorites [heap] paradox formulated broadly in the following way: It seems that no single grain of wheat can make the difference between a number of grains that does, and a number that does not, make a heap. Therefore, since one grain of wheat does not make a heap, it follows that two grains do not; and if two do not, then three do not and so on. This reasoning leads to the absurd conclusion that no number of grains of wheat make a heap. The puzzle undermines the certainty on vague terms which can be assessed by quantitative characteristics. See Dominic Hyde, and Diana Raffman, "Sorites Paradox," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Summer 2018 Edition), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/sorites-paradox/.

[32] J. M. Goodenough, "Parfit and the Sorites Paradox," *Philosophical Studies* 83 (1996): 113.

[33] Parfit makes a thought experiment: Scientists replaced 1% of the cells of my brain and body. I should still continue to exist, even if slightly handicapped in some way. He next proposes a spectrum of operations

Parfit's late view, nevertheless, remains reductionist, dualist, and focusing on the first-person view of self. We are going now to investigate the *identity doesn't matter to morality view* as we labelled the unconditional third-person ascription of personhood to the other, as a unified body-and-mind person, with strong moral implications.

## II. The unconditional ascription of personhood to others. Third-person recognition of personhood in Kant and Wittgenstein

After having examined in short certain personal identity theories from Locke on, we will proceed to investigate the views of the two mentioned above philosophers who seem to declare that we don't need empirical criteria or conditions, to ascribe personhood to other humans. They both seem to consider personhood as a brute fact (we have an indisputable third-person view of the other) in non-empirical practical terms.

### a. Kant's thinker

There are very few short references in Kant's work that are explicitly or implicitly referring to the third-person recognition of a person.

There is a hint in the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason' (in the 'Refutation of Mendelsson's proof of the persistence of

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in which the scientists' activities become more and more extensive; at the far end, they undertake an operation that replaces 99% of the cells of my brain and body leaving only 1% of the original cells in place. In the very last operation, even this 1% is replaced. There is now none of the original physical matter left. If we suppose, as seems reasonable, that my identity is sustained through the replacement of 1% of my cells, and 2% of my cells, and so forth, it seems plausible to believe that my identity continues to be sustained through the replacement of 98%, and then 99%, and finally 100% of my cells. The conclusion should be unacceptable to a believer in the physical criterion of personal identity as it asserts the diachronic continuation of personal identity in a situation with no physical continuity whatsoever (Ibid., 114).

the soul') of the third-person recognition just in the physical appearance of the other:

> Thus the persistence of the soul, merely as an object of inner sense, remains unproved and even unprovable, although its persistence in life, where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself. (*CPR,* B415)

In (A359-60), Kant also notes that

> The expression that only souls think would be dropped; and instead, it would be said, as usual, that human beings think, that the same being that as outer appearance is extended is inwardly (in itself) a subject, which is not composite, but is simple and thinks. (*CPR,* A359-60)

In the third Paralogism of personality, Kant illustrates the contrast between first- and third-person views with a thought experiment:

> The identity of person is therefore inevitably to be encountered in my own consciousness. But if I consider myself from the standpoint of another (as an object of his outer intuition), then it is this external observer who originally considers *me* as in *time*; for in apperception time is properly represented only *in me*. Thus from the I that accompanies –and indeed with complete identity- all representations at every time in my consciousness, *although he admits this I* [our emphasis], he will still not infer the objective persistence of my Self… so the identity that is necessarily combined with my consciousness is not therefore combined with his consciousness, i.e. with the outer intuition of my subject. (*CPR,* A362-363)

Kant does not explain how the third-person viewer admits this 'I', as if it needs no explanation, as if it was a brute fact. In the second Paralogism, Kant admits:

> This is obvious: if someone wants to represent a thinking being, then he must substitute his own subject for the being he wants to consider (which is not obvious in any other species of investigation). (*CRP,* A353-354)

In all these quotations there seems to be a solid belief in human beings as composite (outer and inwardly) simple things that think, whose conscience cannot be intuited, but are certainly considered thinkers by a common way of understanding on the part of their observers. So far in the first Critique, Kant declares that in thinking, subjects do not intuit a self (*CPR,* A 107). "Consciousness itself is not a representation, differentiating an object."[34] All we know are the 'formal conditions' for any representations which are not sufficient to make inferences about the self's constitution (*CPR,* A 398). This is the outcome of the Paralogisms, where Kant does not deny the possibility of raising the question of identity with regard to the self. What he denies is raising it exclusively from the first-person perspective of the rational psychologist. Kant locates rational psychologist's mistake exactly in the contrast between first- and third-person views which is illustrated above in A362-363. From a third-person perspective evaluating my personhood, there can be no outer intuition of my Self persisting in time, but the outer observer *admits this I* of the other (me). From the first-person, the question cannot be asked because 'I' is presupposed as a formal condition of thinking, while by the third-person it can be asked as related to an object of outer sense, but the 'I think' is no longer there. [35]

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[34] Kitcher, "On Interpreting," 45.

[35] Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism. An Interpretation and Defense*

Kitcher believes that "Kant saw no philosophically interesting asymmetry between first and third-person ascriptions of mental states"[36] and consequently "he was oblivious to the kinds of worries that generate philosophical anxiety about other minds."[37] By substituting his own subject for the being he wants to consider, he didn't mean something like the argument from analogy that Mill used on the same subject,[38] but just a common way of understanding. To "substitute his own subject for the being he wants to consider" in A353-354 is something so simple "as we might understand an unobserved linden tree through those we have observed."[39] Other humans are persons by the common way we recognize them and there can be no serious philosophical anxiety about them being robots or aliens etc.

All these short references in the third-person recognition of thinking beings in *CPR* seem to prepare the treatment of persons as the unquestionable intentional objects of morality in practical reason. We can make the remark here that Kant uses the same bridging practice between the speculative and the practical Reason in the case of another central Critical idea namely the transcendental *freedom* which in *CPR* was taken

> in that absolute sense in which speculative reason
> needed it, in its use of the concept of causality,
> in order to rescue itself from the antinomy into

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(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2004), 344-345.

[36] Kitcher, "On Interpreting," 49.

[37] Ibid.

[38] J. S. Mill uses the argument from analogy writing: "Other humans have feelings like me, because they have bodies like me, which I know (in my own case) to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and secondly, they exhibit the acts and other outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings." J. S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (London, UK: Longmans, Green and Co., 1865), 208-209.

[39] Kitcher, "On Interpreting," 49.

which it unavoidably falls when it wants to think the *unconditioned* in the series of causal connection… only problematically, as not impossible to think, without assuring it objective reality… and plunge it into an abyss of skepticism. (*CPrR*, 5:3)

But in the *CPrR* where

its reality is proved by an a apodictic law of practical reason, constitutes the *keystone* of the whole structure of a system of pure reason, even of speculative reason; and other concepts (those of God and immortality), which as mere ideas remain without support in the latter, now attach themselves to this concept and with it and by means of it get stability and objective reality, that is, their *possibility* is *proved* by this: that freedom is real, for this idea reveals itself through the moral law. (*CPrR*, 5:3-4)

Kant reserved the same treatment to the Self, [40] from its initial acceptance in *CRP* as a phenomenon to its grounding use in *CPrR* as a noumenon where it will be a thing in itself, following the general affirmation of the objective reality of the categories applied to noumena which was denied in the first *Critique* (*CPrR*, 5:6). In the *Critique of Practical Reason* (*CPrR*) Kant pinpoints

the paradoxical requirement to make oneself as subject of freedom a noumenon but at the same, with regard to nature, a phenomenon in one's own empirical consciousness. (*CPrR*, 5:6)

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[40] The Self as the 'I' or the 'I think' have a very extensive treatment in the first Critique where the 'I' is the protagonist. What has a 'short treatment' in the first Critique, is the third-person recognition of the other human who will take the leading role in the practical Reason, as the other person becomes the intentional object of the moral law, knowable as a thing in itself.

This happens through

> the union of causality as freedom with causality as
> natural mechanism, the first of which is established
> by the moral law, the second by the law of nature,
> and indeed in *one and the same subject* [my emphasis],
> the human being, is impossible without representing
> him with regard to the first as a being in itself but
> with regard to the second as an appearance, the
> former in pure, the latter in empirical consciousness.
> Otherwise the contradiction of reason with itself is
> unavoidable. (*CPrR*, 5:6)

So, in the practical sense, it is mandatory to face the self as a thing
in itself while in the *CPR* it was only known as a phenomenon.
In other words, the two of them can coincide in *one and the same
subject* under the moral demands of practical reason, a statement
that was originally made at the Paralogisms, where

> the concept of personality, just like the concepts of
> substance and of the simple, can remain (insofar as
> it is merely transcendental, i.e. a unity of the subject
> which is otherwise unknown to us, but in whose
> determinations there is a thoroughgoing connection
> of apperception) and to this extent this concept is
> also necessary and sufficient for practical use. (*CPR*,
> 365-366)

The self has a long and extended treatment throughout all the
first Critique. Patricia Kitcher claims in "Kant's Paralogisms"
that "the discussions of the Paralogisms chapter depend on
and complement the account of the self defended in the
Transcendental Deduction."[41] Kant seems to identify the 'I' of the

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[41] Patricia Kitcher, "Kant's Paralogisms," *The Philosophical Review* 91, no. 4
(1982): 515.

paralogisms with the 'I' of apperception so the Transcendental Deduction where the unity of apperception is introduced is the place where the Kantian materials of construction of the thinker are found.[42] In the Deduction, he is defending the self from Hume's attack who denies any relation of existential dependence among mental states, while he is in complete agreement with him about the failure of introspection to divulge a continuing self.[43] In the first Paralogism "like Descartes, Kant believes that any mental state, a fortiori any judgment, must be attributed to a self, which we can call the subject of the judgment, but unlike Descartes, Kant conceives of this self not as a simple substance."[44] So far my Self is unknown as an object of inner intuition but my mental states can be attributed to my Self which identifies with the I of the unity of apperception. But "this I, he or it (the thing) that thinks" (*CPR,* A346/B404) according to Patricia Kitcher is not empty but consists of "faculties of sensibility, understanding, a productive imagination, and reason that operate in various ways in the combination of representations."[45] This reach-in faculties "I" which I cannot recognize as a simple substance, I can nevertheless attribute to the other without any criteria, just by admitting this "I" to him as to myself (*CPR*, 362) representing him as a thinking being by substituting my own subject for the being I want to consider (A 353-354). No "other minds" problem seems to emerge in the Kantian context and recognizing other humans as persons seems to be a brute fact, a common human practice that cannot be an object of empirical or philosophical research.

The hint of this can be found in the 'Paralogisms of Pure Reason,' in the claim "since the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense" (*CPR,* ) and the claim that "the expression that only souls think would be dropped; and instead, it would be said, as usual, that human beings think"

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[42] Ibid., 523.

[43] Ibid., 524.

[44] Ibid., 526.

[45] Kitcher, "On Interpreting," 48.

(*CPR,* A359-60), which both have an existential essence. Allison says that Kant has already included an existential dimension in his account of apperception early, in B-Deduction, where he remarks in B157 "I am conscious of myself not *as* I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only *that* I am."[46]

Peter Strawson argues that one of the weaknesses of Kant's exposition is "that he barely alludes to the fact that our ordinary concept of personal identity does carry with it empirically applicable criteria for the numerical identity through time of a subject of experiences (a man or human being) and that these criteria, though not the same as those for bodily identity involve an essential reference to human body," but Kant does not ignore it as it is evident in *CPR,* B415[47] (interpreting Kant as saying in this quotation that we need physical criteria for reidentifying persons). Kitcher believes that Strawson's interpretation of this section of the *CPR* is problematic because there is no mention of physical criteria for reidentification in these passages, and "he [Strawson] regards this as the overall message of the chapter"[48] while she takes this Kantian reference "to be simply that during life bodily continuity is the usual way to determine continuity of the self, not that bodily continuity is 'criterial evidence' for self-identity."[49] There is ground though against her interpretation, as bodily criteria can be the only evidence, becoming critical for the persons that exist at the borderline of personhood, (demented, without consciousness, etc.) and it is difficult to say that Kant would exclude them as persons from the moral territory. Kant's conception of human nature emerges from mingled, different criteria, rational, empirical, anthropological, representing his equal interest in all these items expressed in his writings, a fact that

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[46] Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism,* 351.

[47] Peter Strawson, *The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* (London and New York: Routledge 1990), 164.

[48] Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Transcendental Psychology* (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 266-267.

[49] Allen Wood, "Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature," *Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume* 72 (1998): 189.

the rationalistic interpretations of Kant have difficulty to accept.
Allen Wood in "Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature"
says that Kant recognizes three original predispositions of our
nature. 'Humanity' is the capacity to set ends according to reason.
'Animality', which includes our instinctual desires promoting our
survival, reproduction and sociability, 'personality' which is our
rational capacity to give moral laws and obey them (*APPW* 7:321-
324)."[50] Wood, although arguing pro logocentric ethics, which
grounds all duties on the value of humanity or rational nature,
accepts that "of course we should respect rational nature *in*
persons, and this means respecting the persons themselves. But…
we should *also* respect rational nature *in the abstract*, which entails
respecting fragments of it or necessary conditions of it, even
where these are not found in fully rational beings or persons."[51]

Taking into account that Kant rewrote the "Paralogisms of
Pure Reason" for the second edition of the Critique (the only
chapter of the Dialectic which he rewrote), and he spent four
Parologisms on the self or the soul alone, and one antinomy only
for each Idea of the World, Freedom, God, we must take it for
granted that the thinker is the real protagonist of the first critical
enterprise. And if someone wants to identify another human as a
thinking being "he must substitute his own subject for the being
he wants to consider" (*CRP,* A353-354) recognizing him without
criteria of personhood as the intentional object of moral law.

b. Wittgenstein's "eine Einstellung zur Seele"

In Part II, Section iv of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein
writes:

> "I believe that he is suffering." – Do I also *believe* that
> he isn't an automaton?
> It would go against the grain to use the word in both
> connexions. (Or is it like this: I believe that he is

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[50] Ibid., 202.
[51] Ibid.

suffering, but am certain that he is not an automaton? Nonsense!)

Suppose I say of a friend: "He isn't an automaton." – What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a *human being* who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information *could* it give him? (At the very most that this man always behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.)

"I believe that he is not an automaton," just like that, so far makes no sense.

My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul [eine Einstellung zur Seele]. I am not of the *opinion* that he has a soul."

"The human body is the best picture of the human soul." (*PI*, Part II, iv, p.178)

This section that has attracted philosophical attention as illuminating Wittgenstein's attempt to investigate the grammar of the soul, deals with pain expression, souls, human beings, automata. Wittgenstein places the discussion of the soul in the context of the metaphysician's conception of the essence of language as a private inner activity of a disembodied subject. The world 'automaton' has a long presence in metaphysics of the soul.[52] Peter Winch believes that Wittgenstein,

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[52] René Descartes considers animals are mere automata. In Part Five of the *Discourse on Method*, Descartes writes: "I made special efforts to show that if any [automatons] had the organs and outward shape of a monkey or some other animal that lacks reason, we should have no means of knowing that they did not possess entirely the same nature as these animals" (AT VI, 56; CSM I, 139); see René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch, and A. Kenny (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985-1991). J. S. Mill writes also "experience obliges me to conclude that there must be an intermediate link, which must either be the same in others as in myself or a different one. Thus, they are either *alive* or *automatons*;" see J. S. Mill, *An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy* (London: Longmans,

against empiricist behaviorists' and dualists' conceptions, who considered the other man as a conscious being only under certain beliefs about him, seems to say here that this is not a matter of holding a belief or opinion but a matter of having a certain "attitude" towards him.[53] The two "connexions" here are 1) I believe that he is suffering, 2) I also *believe* that he isn't an automaton. Why believing that he is not an automaton makes no sense? It seems that what Wittgenstein claims is that we deal with two different things here. Beliefs or opinions about others being in pain and attitudes towards them as human persons, as souls. And the nonsense is to believe that those two different terms are interdependent in a logical way, although they have a totally different position in the space where they are placed. What kind of statement is to say that someone is not an automaton, what is the practical outcome of this opinion except in the special cases where someone could face an automaton?[54] In our common everyday practice, the other is a human, a soul, and this is not an opinion that we shape out of an assessment of her external behavior that resembles ours, using either the argument from analogy or the one from inference.[55] Her being a soul just appears as a result of our attitude towards a soul.

Winch compares the use of the word "Einstellung" in Section iv with the one in *PI* Part I, §310 :

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Green and Co., 1865), 208-209.

[53] Peter Winch, "Eine Einstellung zur Seele," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series* 81 (1980-1981): 2.

[54] Under certain circumstances, there still remains the *possibility* of seeing others as automata and this has mainly to do with the connections that draws the person who is looking. "[…] the skeptic about other minds presents her problem as one of *knowledge* – as if what we needed was more *evidence* of some kind, something that (*per impossibile*) would allow us to go *beyond* the other's (mere) body, or maybe *through* it, thus reaching a 'naked soul.'" See Jonadas Techio, "Seeing Souls: Wittgenstein and Cavell on Other Minds," *Conversations: The Journal of Cavellian Studies* (2013): 78.

[55] For Mill's *argument from analogy* see ref. 38. The *argument from inference* claims that the best hypothesis we can make is that other people have minds and they are not machines.

> I tell someone I am in pain. His attitude to me will then be that of belief; disbelief; suspicion; and so on. Let us assume he says: "It's not so bad." – Doesn't that prove that he believes in something behind the outward expression of pain?
>
> His attitude is a proof of his attitude. Imagine not merely the words "I am in pain" but also the answer "It's not so bad" replaced by instinctive noises and gestures. (*PI,* Part I, §310)

Winch says that "to be clear what a belief (e.g.) that someone is in pain comes to...[we] should look at the whole range of behavior, demeanor, facial expression, etc. in which such verbal expressions are embedded."[56] By "His attitude is a proof of his attitude" Wittgenstein is not rejecting his belief in something, but his belief "in something behind the outward expression of pain," something like a Cartesian self. By this rejection, Wittgenstein does not declare that all he believes is that the other person is behaving in a certain way. "His belief concerns someone to whom he has "eine Einstellung zur Seele" and this helps to make his belief what it is"[57] a human being for whom "[t]he body is the best picture of the human soul" (*PI,* Part II, iv, p.178).[58] The expression of another's suffering and my belief that he suffers, is confined to a particular occasion, and the generalization of particular occasions (beliefs about his mental states in different times) cannot lead to the belief that he is not an automaton which is "a view of the kind of being he in general is."[59] Him being the kind of being that he is, is the condition of him having mental states. We take it for

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[56] Winch, "Eine Einstellung," 3.

[57] Ibid.

[58] This reference has an impressive resemblance with the Kantian "since the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense." (*CPR,* )

[59] Winch, "Eine Einstellung," 6.

granted that he is having several states of consciousness from our attitude towards him as an attitude towards a soul. There cannot exist a radical separation of soul and external expression of mental states, that would presuppose a private language. Two references in "Einstellung zur Seele" make Winch sound as if he is considering an attitude as a brute fact. One is: "There is no question here of an attitude which I can adopt or abandon at will… it is a condition I am in vis-a-vis other human beings *without choosing* [my emphasis] to be so."[60] The other one is when he interprets Simon Weil's phrase in *The Iliad, Poem of Might* "The human beings around us exert just by their presence a power" as meaning that

> our characteristic reactions towards other people are not based on any theory we have about them, whether it is a theory about their states of consciousness, their likely future behavior, or their inner constitution.[61]

Both these claims refer to Wittgenstein's usually applied phrase "part of the natural history of mankind." Wittgenstein, according to Winch, rejects the empiricist list of states of consciousness needed to ascribe personhood to others by using the attitude towards a soul which seems for him to be 'the way we do it' as part of the natural history of mankind.

Cavell makes a distinction parallel to belief-attitude in "Knowing and Acknowledging." Facing the problem of other minds, he claims that 'the problem' is not a matter of *knowledge,* but rather of *acknowledgment.*

> Your suffering makes a *claim* upon me. It is not enough that I *know* (am certain) that you suffer – I must do or reveal something (whatever can be done). In a word, I must *acknowledge* it, otherwise I do not know what '(your or his) being in pain' means.[62]

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[60] Ibid., 11.

[61] Ibid., 8.

[62] Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (Cambridge: Cambridge

My failure to acknowledge your pain consists of "soul-blindness."[63] The outcome of not acknowledging the other as a soul is "my avoidance of him, call it my denial of him."[64]

It seems that Wittgenstein's attitude does not rest in beliefs about the other, that she has pain etc. but the other way round. Our attitude toward her as having a soul creates the grammatical space for beliefs about her mental states. Edmund Dain concludes in the same line of thought that "human being, a soul, just is on this account what stands at the center of these forms of talk, just is the kind of thing that provides footholds for these concepts, and the kinds of behavior they make intelligible."[65] He compares section iv attitude with section 284 of the *Philosophical Investigations* pertaining to the difference between attitudes towards what is alive and what is dead.

> Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations. – One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a *sensation* to a *thing*? One might as well ascribe it to a number! – And now look at a wriggling fly, and at once these difficulties vanish,

University Press, 1976), 263.

[63] Stanley Cavell, *The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality and Tragedy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 378. Wittgenstein's notions of aspect and meaning-blindness are probably the sources of Cavell's notion of soul-blindness. The former being the failure to see something *as something* (*PI, Part II*, xi §257) the latter the failure to distinguish between different meanings of a word (*PI, Part II*, xi §262-3). In a way soul-blindness contains both aspect and meaning-blindness. Wittgenstein compares soul-blindness with aspect-blindness in *PI, Part I,* §420: "Seeing a living human being as an automaton is analogous to seeing one figure as a limiting case or variant of another; the cross-pieces of a window as a swastika, for example." Techio, "Seeing Souls," 72.

[64] Cavell, *The Claim*, 389.

[65] Edmund Dain, "Wittgenstein on Belief in Other Minds," assessed November 9, 2019, https://www.academia.edu/22598240/Wittgenstein_on_Belief_in_Other_Minds.

and pain seems able to get *a foothold* here, where before everything was, so to speak, too *smooth* for it. (*PI, Part I,* §284)

Is it our beliefs or scientific data ("ascribe it to a number") that which makes us believe that a stone is not suffering but wriggling fly is, or our attitudes towards them? Dain concludes that the difference between attitudes towards what is alive and what is dead "is not a matter of what is true or false in a narrow sense, so much as it is a matter of what it makes sense to say, of the concepts that find a grip, a purchase, and the forms of behavior that are available to us as a result."[66] In the paper "Do We Believe in Other Minds?" on the same subject, Dain defends the opinion that we don't really believe in other minds, but our attitude towards a soul means that "our understanding of others as having minds lies in our basic modes of behavior in relation to other human beings, and the kinds of things that we can say about them."[67] This interpretation seems to be resting on behavior or having to do with our social practices, while Wittgenstein's 'attitude' seems to be something more basic, something outside, or at the borderline of the space of rules and practices. The attitude seems to be more primitive than practices in language games. In *Remarks on the philosophy of psychology* this is stated more explicitly:

Here it is a help to remember that it is a primitive reaction to take care of, to treat, the place that hurts when someone else is in pain, and not merely when one is so oneself – hence it is a primitive reaction to attend to the pain-behaviour of another, as, also, *not* to attend to one's own pain-behaviour. (*RPP*, §915)

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[66] Ibid.

[67] Edmund Dain, "Do We Believe in Other Minds?" *Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein Society* 36 (2016): 45-47.

> What, however, is the word "primitive" meant to say
> here? Presumably, that the mode of behaviour is *pre-*
> *linguistic*: that a language-game is based *on it*: that it
> is the prototype of a mode of thought and not the
> result of thought. (*RPP*, §916)

Maybe attitudes are based on this kind of certainty we acquire
when we reach bedrock where our justifications are exhausted:

> If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached
> bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined
> to say: "This is simply what I do." (*PI, Part I,* §217)

But how does Wittgenstein's attitude towards other souls lead us
to the moral space, the way the Kantian embodied thinker leads
us to the categorical imperative?[68] In the context of pain-feeling
of an embodied subject he remarks:

> […] only of a living human being and what resembles
> (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has
> sensations; it sees; is blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious
> or unconscious. (*PI, Part I,* §281)

From these, possible feelings come out about who "sees; is
blind; hears; is deaf; is conscious or unconscious."

> How am I filled with pity *for this man?* How does it come out
> what the object of my pity is? (Pity, one may say, is a form
> of conviction that someone else is in pain.) (*PI, Part I,* §287)

Pity leads us to the grammar of moral space where human
beings recognize each other not *because* of the pain expressions

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[68] Especially the second formulation, the so-called *formula of humanity*: "So
act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person
of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means."
(*GMM*, 4:429)

alone but because their attitude towards other souls makes them recognize their pain and have spontaneous and primitive reactions of sympathy for them. If rocks or speaking automata had pain, even expressing it, could we feel pity for them? (Maybe yes but it would be out of moral space). We could not have towards them the attitude that we have towards human beings.

Attitude towards a soul makes Wittgenstein as well as Kant radical opponents of dualistic conceptions of human nature, mainly of utilitarian origin, that thrive in the contemporary bioethical field.[69] Wittgenstein, much like Kant, does not discriminate or distinguish among persons, he counts as living human beings the unconscious, the blind, the deaf. It's not the contingent expression or ability to express mental states that has a moral impact on us but our permanent not empirically formed attitude towards souls that make us spell our moral vocabulary no matter how disabled the others can be, whether physically or mentally.

There is a vast bibliography connecting Kant and Wittgenstein through their claims about the "unknowability" of cognitive subjects and "unknowability of the subject of

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[69] Peter Singer's 'opinion' that "the fact that a being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings" faces human nature under the dualistic evaluation of mental capacities as important and the bodily remnants of a human being without those capacities as redundant. His 'opinion' conflicts with common beliefs on the value of human persons as both body and mind that is expressed in Wittgenstein's 'attitude towards a soul' when we face other humans; see Peter Singer, *Practical Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 182. For a detailed discussion on the ethics of infanticide from antiquity till present time see Evangelos D. Protopapadakis, *From Dawn till Dusk: Bioethical Insights into the Beginning and the End of Life* (Berlin: Logos Verlag, 2019), 21-48.

thought."[70] Kitcher believes that Kant's epistemic analyses that lead to a model of the cognitive self have nothing to do with Wittgenstein's remarks:

> There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.... (*TLP*, 5.631)

> The subject does not belong to the world: rather it is a limit of the world (*TLP*, 5.632)

According to Kitcher

> Kant's claims about the special status of the 'I think' by appealing to the early Wittgenstein makes sense only if there are some real affinities between the former's ways of thinking about the synthetic a priori and the latter's attitude towards the inexpressible.[71]

But Kant posited his synthetic a priori claims in transcendental deduction, while Wittgenstein wanted non-logical claims only to be "shown." Comparing Wittgenstein's 'I' with Kant thinkers is a discussion that we can't entangle with here, a discussion much more extensive than our original intention to compare their views on the third-person ascription of personhood to others, where our focus is limited. In this much more limited space, both conceptually and textually, because of the very few references of the two philosophers on that matter, we discover a convergence in their opinions. Their references have in common an anti-skeptical, anti-dualist position, rejecting the possibility of facing other humans as automata, or non-souls, or aliens, etc. in everyday practice.

Cavell in "What is the Scandal of Skepticism" claims that objects' skepticism is acceptable. "I [can] object to your claim to know by saying for example, that 'you don't see the back half of

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[70] Kitcher, "On Interpreting," 33-35. See n. 2
[71] Ibid., 41.

the object'… the case of the material object is argumentative."[72] But the skepticism of the other person is "too trivial almost to mention" because everybody knows others because of their behavior, or their contact "or the subtler movements of the body, especially the face."[73] Cavell seems to suggest that we know that the other is not transparent, but we always recognize her in the way we do it in our form of life. The unconditional recognition of the other person for Cavell bears a similarity to Wittgenstein's vision of the metaphysical ungroundedness of language, of our ability to go on without concepts.[74]

## III. Conclusion

Our initial question was about the possibility of ascribing personhood and moral status to non-ideal agents. Comatose, demented, unable to communicate any information or terminally ill patients represented by a proxy or by advance directives, are residents of the 'personal identity's twilight' zone. How can personhood be preserved at the dawn of personal identity? The orthodox empiricist dualist conceptions of personal identity as the *relational* account, together with the *narrative*, the *anthropological*, and the *relativist* view cannot perform that task as they are grounded on the contingency of different scientific beliefs, different societies, different narratives, and customs. Late Parfit's *identity-doesn't-matter-to-survival*-view, although initially offering an unconditional view of personhood surviving several bodily changes, is essentially dualistic and has many empiricist assumptions (i.e. equating persons to their brains) failing to answer our question. Kant and Wittgenstein's views on an unconditional third-person acknowledgment of others' personhood that we investigated, as the *identity-*

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[72] Stanley Cavell, *Philosophy the Day after Tomorrow* (Cambridge, MA, and London, UK: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 149.
[73] Ibid., 149-150.
[74] Ibid., 135.

*doesn't-matter-to-morality-* view, seem to satisfy our common beliefs and practices leaving space for other minds problem only in special circumstances where it can be raised (i.e. the society in 'The Matrix' movie).

Skepticism of other minds is not only a scandal as Cavell puts it, but is also a philosophical tendency in bioethics, where the utilitarian rationale ascribes degrees of personal identity to humans estimating accordingly their lives as worth living or not, as it is in the case and euthanasia or infanticide. Kant and Wittgenstein seem to take the third-person unconditional ascription of personhood to others as a brute fact, leaving no space for discriminating among kinds, or classes of persons. Cora Diamond in "The Importance of Being Human" suggests that we could put imagination in action to engage our moral concerns with disabled persons by trying to imagine the kind of lives they live. We should engage with an "imaginative elaboration of what it is to have a human life" as a "response to *having a human life to lead* – to what we find strange or dark or marvelous in it – may be seen as present in actions, thoughts, talk, feelings, customs."[75] She proposes it as an answer to the empiricist evaluations or classifications of human beings which "deny the existence of imaginative shaping of meaning, and [...] treat thought about morality as capable of going on without loss in a context emptied of all intimacy with such imaginative *shapings*."[76]

The persistence of the soul in life where the thinking being (as a human being) is at the same time an object of outer sense, is clear of itself (*CPR* B 415) as the human body is the best picture of the human soul (*PI, Part II, iv, p.178*).

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[75] Diamond, "The Importance," 48.

[76] Ibid.

## Abbreviations

Kant's writings are cited using the following abbreviations:

*CPR Critique of Pure Reason*
*CPrR Critique of Practical Reason*
*APPW Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view*

Wittgenstein's writings are cited using the following abbreviations:

*RPP Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*
*PI Philosophical Investigations*
*TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*

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