

HELD'S CONCEPTUALIZATION OF GLOBALIZATION PROCESS

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Abstract: *Researching the interpretations of globalization is multi layered and therefore it is hard to cover all the areas of its application, as well as its manifestations. Multidimensional character of definition of globalization is also difficult because it is not a state but a process, so the difficulties of its conceptualization are associated with thematic and rational approach to this process. After analyzing the most common definitions of globalization, and with special attention given to Held's approach and classification, the author of this paper concludes that globalization is essentially connected with de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation of the socio-economic, political and cultural boundaries. Globalization, in other words, compresses time and space, which in turn increases interpersonal relationships and accelerates communication among people. Last but not least, globalization, the author asserts, is a complex, ambivalent and controversial process, which increases interdependence and deepens social relations between different factors in almost all aspects of the present-day life.*

Keywords: *globalization, understanding, de-territorialisation, re-territorialisation, space, time, Held, hyperglobalists, sceptics, transformationalists.*

Although the term globalization dates further back, it has been introduced into the wider use in the 1960s, while the onset of the true debate about it is marked in the late 1980s and early 1990s.¹ Despite the large body of literature about globalization that has been published over the course of the last two decades, there is still not a single convincing theory of globalization. Even more, there are no systematic analyses of its major characteristics present today. The hardship lies not only in the different approaches to one such analysis, but in the different classifications of those approaches. Also, relatively frequent, undifferentiated use of the term² is problematic since the “self-evidence” of a term does not suffice for its philosophical meaning. Moreover, globalization is in danger to become, if it has not already become, a handy phrase of our times - an omnipotent word that covers a wide span of activities from global market to internet³, while offering a little insight into contemporary issues.

¹ The term, according to Giddens, has come out of nowhere only to become a key topic in economic, cultural and political discussions today.

² It suffices to say that in July 2017 there were about 48 million web sites on globalization, only in English!

³ Or, as Clark says, globalization is everything and anything from Internet to hamburgers. I. Clark, *Globalization and International Relations Theory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 35.

Due to a variety of criteria used to classify approaches to globalization and a multitude of questions that are thereby revealed, it is hard to provide even an incomplete record of definitions and standpoints on globalization. Even if such a task were possible, that certainly would not be the intent of this author to layout a list of definitions. Mere compiling of such information would be useless unless supported by a thorough analysis of its sources and the context of recorded uses. For a philosopher, in other words, it is far more important to focus on definitions and interpretations of globalization as classified according to an appropriate set of standards.

Further on, I will first note a few definitions given by well-known theorists of globalization, and then I will show some of its most relevant classifications. In order to keep the research undissolved into numerous elaborations of the globalization itself, most attention will be devoted to D. Held's classification. I will not debate whether or not the noted classifications are thorough and consistent, and where is the subtle, yet clear, line between theory of globalization and the (more or less) comprehensive standpoints about it, as well as theoretical generalizations.

Here are some leading definitions of the concept of globalization:

- *The inexorable integration of markets, nation-states, and technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way that is enabling individuals, corporations and nation-states to reach around the world farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before ... the spread of free-market capitalism to virtually every country in the world.*⁴

- *The integration of the world economy.*⁵

- *Integration on the basis of a project pursuing market rule on a global scale.*⁶

- *Deterritorialization – or ... growth of supraterritorial relations between people.*⁷

- *It is nothing but "recolonization" in a new garb.*⁸

- *The compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole... concrete global interdependence and consciousness of the global whole in the twentieth century.*⁹

- *A social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are receding.*¹⁰

- *The intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa.*¹¹

- *The historical transformation constituted by the sum of particular forms and instances of*

⁴ T. L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999), 7-8.

⁵ R. Gilpin, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 364.

⁶ P. McMichael, *Development and Social Change* (Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 2000), xxiii, 149.

⁷ A. J. Scholte, *Globalization: A Critical Introduction* (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave, 2000), 46.

⁸ J. Neeraj, *Globalisation or Recolonisation* (Pune: Elgar, 2001), 6-7.

⁹ R. Robertson, *Globalization* (London: Sage, 1992), 8.

¹⁰ M. Waters, *Globalization* (London: Routledge, 1995), 3.

¹¹ A. Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 64.

... [m]aking or being made global (i) by the active dissemination of practices, values, technology and other human products throughout the globe (ii) when global practices and so on exercise an increasing influence over people's lives (iii) when the globe serves as a focus for, or a premise in shaping, human activities.¹²

- A process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organisation of social relations and transactions, expressed in transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and power.¹³

Many authors write about fervent theoretical and ideological discussions and debates of rivaling concepts about the globalization itself, its understanding and character. Some see the globalization as an embodiment of an ironclad historical inevitability, for others it is only a large myth. Some assert that globalization is an objective and spontaneous planetary process, while their opponents view it exclusively as scheme¹⁴ for assuring Western domination - that is Americanization of the world. Further, there are authors who believe that the globalization is a new and unique phenomenon in the history of the human kind, and there are those who see it as a process that has come to an end in the 20th century as capitalism¹⁵ spread around the whole planet. Some argue that globalization means the end of nation states, whereas others insist that in the increasingly integrated world the role of nation states will become even more important. On the one hand we hear that cultural homogenization is an inevitable outcome of globalization, on the other, that the interactions caused by the globalization will create a new cultural diversity. While for one line of thought it signifies the integration of the world, for others it inevitably causes fragmentation, deepening of the social gap between worlds and ultimately a clash of civilizations. If the winners in the globalization see exclusively a civilization progress and added benefits for the humanity, for losers it is but a destructive force.

When speaking about different elements of globalization, U. Beck¹⁶ finds two major approaches to its analysis. One encompasses authors such as I. M. Wallerstein, J. N. Rosenau, R. Gilpin, Held, R. Robertson and A. Apadurai who insists that there is one central logic of globalization; another consists of authors that suggest and use a set of interdependent elements as necessary to explain

¹² M. Albrow, *The Global Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 1996), 88.

¹³ D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Polity Press, 1999), 16.

¹⁴ Even those who do agree that globalization is a project, disagree on other points. Some hold that globalization is just a myth – a form without a cognitive content – while others believe that it is an ideological project with a real content supported by a number of influential groups.

¹⁵ Kellner, following Horkheimer, asserts that it is possible to say that whoever speaks of capitalism must speak of globalization, and that it is not possible to theorize globalization without talking about the re-structuring of capitalism. D. Kellner, "Theorizing Globalization", *Sociological Theory* 20, no. 3 (2002): 289. For more details see: Ž. Delić, Ž. Kaluderović, A. Nuhanović, „Kritika globaliziranog (neo)liberalnog kapitalizma i njegovih finansijskih institucija“, *Pregled LV* (2014): 1-15.

¹⁶ This importance of the proper use of terms is well shown in Beck, who distinguishes between the terms "globalism" on the one side, and "globality" and "globalization" on the other. U. Beck, *Was ist Globalisierung?* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1998).

globalization. It would be difficult even to name all of these authors both due to constant changes in their positions and due to emphasizing particular elements of globalization.

In that respect Beck made himself well known by highlighting the idea of risk in the context of the ecological dimension of globalization. Further, Robertson is one of the first authors to emphasize cultural aspects of globalization. M. Shaw points out war as the cause of globalization. Held, Rozenau and Gilpin, each in their own way, focus on the political sphere, while S. Strange and K. Omae, *inter alia*, pointed out the technological aspect of globalization. Besides stressing the importance of communicational technology, Apadurai speaks mostly about the influence of migration on the process of globalization. L. Sklair underscores capitalism, while G. Soros emphasizes the role of financial markets. D. Harvey speaks of the geographical element, and S. Sassen of the urban one.¹⁷

One of the most significant authors who have contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of globalization is David Held, Master of University College, Durham and Professor of Politics and International Relations at Durham University.¹⁸ I have already mentioned his definition of globalization and now I will add that globalization, according to Held, is characterized by four types of changes. Firstly, globalization encompasses the expansion of social, economic, and political activities beyond the boundaries of states, regions and continents. Secondly, it is characterized by the strengthening or increased significance of inter-connectedness and the flow of trade, goods, capital, as well as culture and people. Thirdly, globalization may correlate with the acceleration of global processes and interactions. Lastly, increased expanding, strengthening and accelerating of global interactions may correlate with their increasing influence upon fluidity of the boundaries between local and global events. To put it more simply, according to Held, globalization can be understood as extending, intensifying, accelerating and increasing the importance and influence of inter-connectedness among people around the world.¹⁹

Held's classification of the theorists on globalization as *hyperglobalists*, *sceptics* and *transformationalists* is certainly the most famous one, although it is just one of various concepts, theories or schools of thought. Since globalization is not a neutral term, each of these three schools of thought offers a different view of the globalization, i.e. it tries to understand and explain this phenomenon in a diversified manner. In addition to being different from each other, each of the afore

¹⁷ For more details see: V. Vuletić, „Rivalski pristupi u izučavanju globalizacije“, in *Aspekti globalizacije*, eds. V. Pavičević, V. Petrović, I. Pantelić, M. Sitarski, G. Milovanović (Dosije – Beograd: BOŠ, 2003), 57.

¹⁸ According to Held there are four types of globalization: thick globalization, diffused globalization, expansive globalization and thin globalization. D. Held, A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton, *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Stanford: Polity Press, 1999), 211-222.

¹⁹ For the opposing view see B. Michael, „Theorising the Politics of Globalisation: A Critique of Held et al.'s „Transformationalism“, <http://www.fatih.edu.tr/~jesr/Globalisation.pdf>. Michael finds this classification to be “inadequate”.

mentioned perspectives also reflects a set of general arguments on globalization that deal with its conceptualization, its *novum* role in history, its implications on the power and position of states, its potential for democratization, as well as its historical achievements and intentions.

According to hyperglobalists, globalization mostly means entering the new era characterized by global capitalism, global governance and global citizenship. The difference between the present and past is the existence of global economy which transcends and unites the biggest economic regions in the world.²⁰ Through various descriptions of “manic capitalism”, “turbo capitalism” and “supra territorial capitalism”, these (hyper)globalists intend to understand the qualitative change in the spatial organization and dynamics within the realm of this new global capitalism. They see strategic economic activities as immanently removed from boundaries of nation-states. Today, it is the capital in the hands of largest world's corporations and financial institutions that dictates the organization, location and distribution of economic power and goods - rather than the states.

Within the ranks of hyperglobalists there is significant normative disagreement between neoliberals who value the triumph of individualism and free market, and radical activists - neomarxists - for whom globalization represents the victory of cruel and exploitative global capitalism. Despite divergent ideological views, all hyperglobalists agree that the globalization is primarily an economic phenomenon, that world economy is more and more integrated, and that the need for global capital imposes appropriate economic discipline which, in turn, drives most of the governments to practice politics less as “the art of the possible”, but rather as “appropriate economic governance”.

Hyperglobalists, according to Held, admit that globalization continually deepens the gap between the losers²¹ and winners in the new economy. However, according to the ambitious position of neoliberals, this does not necessarily mean that one side must lose a lot or even everything for the other side to gain as much. Some parts of states may lose in the game of globalization, but each of these states has competitive advantages which will come into the play sooner or later in the field of open and fair competition in the global market. It appears that neoliberals do not want to acknowledge that global capitalism not only creates, but even purposely works on strengthening the structural forms of inequality, both within and between nation-states. The Neoliberal idea of the demolition of the social state and the drastic narrowing of the economic power inevitably leads to malignant social consequences. M. Pečujlić adds: “Contrary to social capitalism, the project of “welfare state” which simultaneously increases the wealth and distributes the welfare to all wider social strata, neoliberal formula hastens the

²⁰ K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

²¹ Some authors view terrorism as a manifestation of the dark side of globalization, or as a radical expression of the losers in globalization - so called globophobia.

accumulation of wealth for a few, while increasing social inequality and leads to globalization of poverty... If we compare two historic periods: from 1960-1980 and 1980-2000, corresponding to the rule of two different economic models, all indicators of economic progress point in the same direction - the last two decades are characterized with slow, or no progress. This increasing social discrepancy does not exist only between the First and the Third world, but the ripples of the 'new poverty' are felt within wealthy societies as well. 'Black holes of globalization', disenfranchised people and territories are found in every big city of the First world: ghettos in the U.S.' communities of Northern Africans in France, and Japanese Zoseba areas. In these areas we find millions of homeless people, great deal of prostitution, criminal and drugs, sick and illiterate (M. Castells, p. 168)".²²

In economies without country borders the role of national governments is reduced to a little more than the transmission of global capital, or they just serve as intermediary institutions between increasingly powerful local, regional and global governance bodies. Globalization, according to hyperglobalists, means the end of nation-state, it has deprived it of its autonomy and sovereignty. This erosion of power and importance of nation-states and old structures is happening within the framework and control of capitalism and new technologies. Existing multilateral institutions which dominate world's economy, particularly G8, IMF, WB and WTO - mostly function by supporting the emerging "civilization of the global market".

It is certain that increased importance of the regional and global governance institutions will cause a decrease in sovereignty and autonomy of nation-states. On the other hand, it will make it easier for people from different countries to cooperate, alongside the increase in the global infrastructure of communication and firm awareness on numerous common interests, regardless of the place of origin. According to hyperglobalists this should witness that the process of development of the "global citizenship" has started.²³

In the context of the social structure takes place the transformation of the overall social relations, which ultimately should result in the creation of a new global civilization. In the end, hyperglobalists agree that globalization, regardless of whether it is considered from a liberal or radical leftist perspective represents the embodiment of the fundamental transformation of the "order of human action".²⁴

Information and media revolution²⁵, together with its cultural products, reach beyond geographical borders and impact local cultural environments. Local horizons widen, and food, entertainment and life-style preferences homogenize. Constant movement of images on TV screens (movies, TV series, shows, pop idols, so called celebrities, even daily news) cause spiritual deterritorialization and create a culture rich

²² For more details see M. Pečujlić, „Globalizacija-dva lika sveta“, in *Aspekti globalizacije*, eds. V. Pavićević, V. Petrović, I. Pantelić, M. Sitarski, G. Milovanović (Dosijske – Beograd: BOŠ. 2003), 22-24.

²³ Economic and political power, according to hyperglobalists, goes beyond the borders of states and nations, to the point to which these are just "transitional forms of financial institutions". K. Ohmae, *The End of the Nation State* (New York: Free Press, 1995).²⁴

²⁵ For more details see D. Donev, Ž. Kaluderović, „Etičke dileme u novim medijima“, *Media and Communication / Mediji i komunikacije* III, no. 5 (2016): 115-125.

with global information. Simultaneous to this global development of mass culture is the growth of cosmopolitan culture - the sense of openness towards the world and of being a citizen of the world - the feeling which transcends the local milieu.²⁶

Sceptics, on the other hand, based on the data on the flow of goods, services, capital and people in the last hundred years, argue that the current level of economic interdependence in the world does not historically represent any precedent.²⁷ In their view we can talk less about globalization, because it necessarily implies a fully integrated global economy, and more about an increased level of internationalization and interaction between predominantly national economies.²⁸ While sceptics argue that globalization is a myth, they fully rely on the economic concept of globalization, identifying it primarily with a perfectly integrated global market. Arguing that the current level of integration does not meet this "ideal" of full integration, and that such integration is less distinctive than the one from the 19th century (so called era of the "golden standard", sceptics assert that the "accomplishments" of the present day "globalization" are completely overstated. They further find the hyperglobalists' views to be basically wrong and politically naïve in their underestimation of the power and endurance of national governments in their role as regulators of international economic activities. According to the sceptics, the intensity of internationalization is not only beyond national control, but it actually depends on the regulatory power of national government which enables and guarantees the continual economic liberation.

If any conclusion can be drawn from the current socio-political situation, it is, according to sceptics, the fact that the economic activity is subject to a kind of "regionalization"²⁹, because the world economy predominantly takes place between the three major financial and trade blocs: Europe, Pacific region and North America.³⁰

Also, sceptics are hesitant to accept the idea of internationalization as a new world order in which national governments do not play a key role. They point to the increasing importance of national governments in regulating and active promoting of cross-border economic activities. Therefore, national governments are not

²⁶ One thing that hyperglobalist do not acknowledge is that the process of "cultural deterioration" is not a balanced one. It impacts relatively small percentage of the world's population - the well-off class with high mobility - which testifies to the fact that this is indeed a process of westernizing the world. Most of the inhabitants of the Third World spend their time struggling to survive, rather than enjoying the luxuries of the consumerism, such as cell phones and broadband internet. They are destined to live and die on the same territory and are trapped in what Baumann calls the "local cage".

²⁷ Gordon (D. Gordon, "The Global Economy: New Edifice or Crumbling Foundations", *New Left Review* 168, 1988) and Weiss (L. Weiss, *The Myth of the Powerless State*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988) find that geographically speaking, when we compare present international economy with the one in the times of the great empires, we find the former to be significantly smaller than the latter.

²⁸ P. Hirst, G. Thompson, "Global Myths and National Policies", *Renewal* 4, no. 2 (1996).

²⁹ Sceptics see "globalization" and "regionalization" as contradictory concepts.

³⁰ This division is also called "triadization" and, according to sceptics, it is manifest in almost all aspects of international relationships. For example, in the realm of global communications, most of the expensive optic fiber cables are running the lines of the "informational super highways" between North America, Europe and East Asia. According to Linné approximately 80% of information exchange happens between the US, Europe and Japan. T. Linné, *Globalization: Winners and Losers*, as found on the web: <http://www.ichei.org/bibliotheque/AnnaDIMITROVA.pdf>.

victims of internationalization, but rather their leading force. Gilpin, for example, considers internalization to be a side-effect of an Americanized multilateral economic order which, as a result of the WWII, has since inspired liberalization of national economies. A. Callinicos³¹ offers a different perspective when he interprets the current intensification of world trade and expansion of foreign investment as just another phase of Western imperialism, in which the national governments, being directly connected to monopoly capital, are deeply involved.

However, despite the differences in emphasizing of individual aspects, sceptics agree that no matter what drives internationalization, it does not decrease the gap between the rich North and the poor South. To the contrary, it causes greater economic marginalization of many countries which are euphemistically called “developing”. Just as trade and investments between prosperous countries of the developed North grow, exclusion and marginalization of the majority of remaining countries in the world increases. Moreover, one can challenge the common belief that the new labour distribution pattern means deindustrialization of the North by means of multinational companies outsourcing their operations and thus industrializing the South. J. Allen and G. Thompson³², for example, destroy the “global corporation myth” by emphasizing the fact that foreign investments circulate and are exchanged mostly between the most developed countries and that majority of multinational companies are primarily a product of their countries and regions. Similarly, sceptics argue against the view that internationalization causes fundamental or at least significant restructuring of global economic relations. In this respect, their position is based on deeply rooted forms of inequality and strict hierarchy in the world’s economy which in terms of structure has not significantly changed in the past century.

According to many sceptics, deep inequality feeds various kinds of fundamentalism and volatile nationalism, rather than creating a global civilization. Moreover, it fragments the world into civilizational blocs and cultural and ethnic enclaves. S. Huntington³³ pointed to the terrors of this new age: international and civil wars, strengthening of terrorism and various forms of organized crime. All of these contribute to the general sense of uncertainty of life. All of this he embraced in the well-known phrase on “clash of civilizations”, while B. Barber³⁴, similarly, speaks of the age of the “lesser evil” in which one must choose between two evils that he symbolically called the McWorld and Jihad. Hereby, he contrasts the homogenous and commercial tendencies of global economy and culture with traditional cultures which often resist globalization processes. T. L. Friedman³⁵

³¹ A. Callinicos et al., *Marxism and the New Imperialism* (London: Bookmarks, 1994).

³² J. Allen, G. Thompson, “Think global, then think again - economic globalization in context”, *Area* 29, no. 3 (1997).

³³ S. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

³⁴ B. Barber, *Jihad vs. McWorld, How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995).

³⁵ T. L. Friedman, *The Lexus and the Olive Tree* (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 1999).

uses the seemingly more benevolent distinction between Lexus and olive tree. Lexus is a car manufactured by the famous Japanese car manufacturer Toyota that symbolizes modernization, wealth, luxury and the consumer mentality of the West, while the olive tree stands for tradition and stable communities. Deepening of global inequality, true politics of international relations and “clash of civilizations” point to the deceiving nature of “global governance” to such an extent that the governing of the world order predominately remains, as it has been for the past hundred years, in the hands of Western countries. With that in mind, sceptics understand “global governance” and economic internationalization as mostly Western projects whose main purpose is to maintain the domination of the West in the world business. The deciding factor of the international order, therefore, is not interdependence, but dependence.³⁶ In the sceptics’ footsteps, one may say that “international order” and “international solidarity”³⁷ will remain the catchphrases of those who see themselves powerful enough to impose these onto others.

The concepts of cultural homogenization and global culture are also solely advanced and masked myths which are easily destroyed by the sceptics’ arguments. In reality, one can easily detect the Western drive for cultural hegemony, for creating a monoculture, absolute uniformity and standardization of life styles and for the destruction of all other versions and ways of life. It is more precise to speak of Americanization - Mcdonaldization and Cocacol(oni)zation of culture – rather than Westernization. According to sceptics, we should say that, just as much as deeply inaccurate and counterproductive is the thesis of hyperglobalists about the death of a nation state and sovereignty in the political sphere, equally untrue and harmful is their prediction of the death of national, local cultures, as incurably parochial and conservative, i.e. as archaic remnants of the distant past.

Finally, offering a specific solution to these somewhat opposing and different views, are the authors who see globalization as a real process, but also a complex phenomenon full of contradictions. These, we may say, are today’s mainstream. Transformationalists hold that globalization is the moving force behind social, political and economic changes that affect modern societies and the entire global order. The current process of globalization, according to them, is new to the human kind and it is up to communities and governments worldwide to find ways to adapt to the new reality characterized by vague boundaries between international and national, i.e. foreign and internal affairs. According to Rosenau³⁸, increase in “inter-domestic” affairs sets “new boundaries”, expansion of political, economic and social space in which destiny of communities and societies is being shaped.

³⁶ The solution for this authoritarian outlook on globalization is not isolation, or anti-globalizational fundamentalism. The future doesn’t consist of self-sustainable national economies, super-technology should not be viewed as a priori evil, and national culture shouldn’t not be fully preserved. It is not true that the progress is possible only if we radically part from the emerging global order.

³⁷ The relative character of “international solidarity” is well shown in the seemingly surprising fact that the help for the “developing countries” has been declining for the past few decades to the point of being four time lesser than ever before.

³⁸ J. N. Rosenau, *Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

The globalization, therefore, is a powerful force aimed towards the transformation of the world and is responsible for massive and radical reorganization of societies, economies, governing institutions, as well as the world order.

Nevertheless, the direction of this reorganization is not pre-determined since globalization is understood as an intrinsically unpredictable process. In other words, globalization is an open and dynamic concept without a clear direction and with no established techniques for transformation of the world. Unlike hyperglobalists and sceptics, the transformationalists demand no particular course of globalization and do not judge existing trends according to a particular fixed ideal of globalized world. They rather see globalization as a long term historical process marked with contradictions and dependent on a plurality of factors.

The caution of the transformationalists about the very future of globalization is due to the belief that modern modalities of global economic, political, cultural, technological, military, ecological and migratory flows are hardly predictable and cannot be compared with any other period in human history. Deep connectedness of the world into one entity is not seen by them as proof of convergence or of forthcoming emergence of a single, unified global society. To the contrary, transformationalists see the globalization as related to new forms of global stratification within which some countries, societies or communities are becoming more interlaced and connected to form a single global order, whereas others are more and more marginalized. To speak of the North-South split, or the division between the First and the Third world, means to overlook the ways in which globalization transforms traditional modes of establishing and disestablishing relationships between countries while creating a new hierarchy of power in the whole world. Transformationalists think that we should not speak of the social structure pyramid any more - with the elite on the top, and bigger and more numerous classes as we go down the line to the bottom - but rather about a three-layered format that resembles the image of concentric circles. Each circle in this scheme surpasses national boundaries as the first one represents elite, the next the so called "content" and the third one the marginalized population.³⁹

The transformation of the forms of global stratification is closely connected with the growing deterioration of economic activities, among others, just as production and financial transactions are becoming more and more global and transnational. The transformationalists hold that national economies are being transformed through the process of economic globalization in the degree that national economic space simply does not coincide with national and state boundaries. In such a globalized economy these systems of production that transcend the boundaries of states, trade and financial transactions are even more tightly connected than some traditional values which connect communities and

³⁹ A. Hoogvelt, *Globalisation and the Postcolonial World: The New Political Economy of Development* (London: Macmillan Press, 1997).

people on different continents.

Contemporary globalization, according to transformationalists, reconstructs or “re-designs” the power, function and authority of national governments. Although they do not question governments’ right to effectively control what is happening on its territory, the transformationalists believe that the competence of international institutions, as well as obligations arising from the norms of international law can, to a certain extent, correspond to the usual understanding of sovereignty and integrity. This is obvious in many transnational organizations like ASEAN, NAFTA, OPEC, OECD, WTO and EU. In the European Union, for example, there is a coexistence and simultaneous functioning of national governments, regional and local assemblies, as well as decisions and norms passed in the center of the organization. Delegation of responsibilities and their supplementation enable for many European citizens to have a second capital city (Brussels) in addition to their own and that is not merely symbolically. In these new circumstances the concept of nation-state as an independent, autonomous and self-sufficient unit is more and more just an echo of the past, and less an image of reality in any of modern states. Globalization is, according to transformationalists, connected with reconceptualization, transformation or differentiation of the relationship between sovereignty, territorial integrity and power of a country.⁴⁰

Claiming that globalization transforms or reconstitutes the power and authority of national governments, the transformationalists reject the hyperglobalists’ thesis of the cessation of the sovereignty of national states, as well as the sceptics’ view of the absence of any significant changes in the last decades. Instead of these, often to the extreme polarized viewpoints, the transformationalists simply think that the new model of sovereignty only suppresses the traditional concept of the state as an absolute, indivisible, territorially exclusive and complete form of public power. The contemporary concept of sovereignty according to them, should be understood “less as a territorially bounded space, and more as a political source of negotiation characterized by complex transnational networks”⁴¹.

This, of course, does not mean that state borders no longer have any political, military or symbolic function or significance, but the recognition that their consideration as the primary spatial points of reference of modern life signifies that they can be relativized in an era of ever more intensifying globalization. Transformationalists believe that globalization has to do not only with new modes of sovereignty, but also with the emergence of powerful non-territorial forms of economic and political organizing at a global level, such as multinational corporations, transnational social movements, international regulatory agencies,

⁴⁰ Of course, there are countries – the most powerful ones – which did not change their idea of sovereignty. They most often simply ignore newly established rules and institutions.

⁴¹ R. Ó. Keohane, “Hobbes’s Dilemma and Institutional Change in World Politics: Sovereignty in International Society”, in *Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End of the Cold War*, eds. H.-H. Holm and G. Sorensen (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), 165-86.

etc. The world can no longer be considered exclusively as state-centric or as the one in which countries dominate, because today the authority diffuses between public and private agencies at the local, national, regional and global level.

What this new order needs is to adjust forms and roles of states, just as governance needs a coherent strategy for matching all the elements of the globalized world. The relevant strategies range from neoliberal models with minimal roles of states, developing models of states in which government promotes economic expansion, and catalytic state in which government enables and facilitates joint operation. According to transformationalists, globalization does not mean the “death” of state, but rather encourages an entire range of adaptive strategies and to a certain point enables a more effective one. Therefore, the power of national governments is not necessarily weakened by the process of globalization, but it is reconstructed and restructured to meet the needs of the complex governance structures in the increasingly interconnected world.

A specific indirect transformationalists’ view is obvious in the new terms which were created in order to describe the content of present globalization. The antithesis of globalization-localization is synthesized in the term glocalization that stands mostly for interlacing the local content with global influences (Robertson). A resolution for the dispute regarding the crucial factors which are active in the modern world, in which some emphasize nation states and others advocate transnational organizations, is sought by the so called post- international era of politics. When it comes to culture, the homeganization-heteroginazation dichotomy is surmounted by the term hybridization of culture.⁴²

The adjustment of local societies to the new state of affairs is a number one item on the agenda for 21st century which can be hardly ignored. Adjustment is a must, not only due to strong pressure from without, but also as a true need of each society, a manner of overtaking and qualitatively treating of the superior civilization heritage such as: modern technology, more efficient market economy, democratic forms of political life, human rights and the broadening of local cultural horizon.

The need for democratization of the global order - transnational and supranational institutions, forms of government - is the other side of the same challenge: to create a decent “global society”. There are many groups and social movements, cultural, scientific, philosophical and political elites that are driven by the dark side and risks of the authoritarian form of globalization to search for corrections and alternatives – “for different form of mondialisation”. In economic and social sphere, instead of the globalization of poverty, poverty alleviation, the reduction of gaps between societies, the write-off of debts to poor countries, the taxation of speculative financial capital and the introduction of basic, minimum income for all citizens are required. Politically, we see the emergence of projects of cosmopolitan democracy anywhere from the local participation of citizens,

⁴² The views of Held and other like-minded thinkers which were elaborated in this paper may be also found in their books and at Global Transformations Website: <http://www.polity.co.uk/global/>.

the regional collective decision making (“collective”, “shared sovereignty”) to the reformation of the UN and the adoption of democratic global legislation. The tendency to change from one sided to multisided global community is strong. Projects of cultural pluralism, mutual enrichment and interlacing of civilizations will replace the destruction of national culture as well as the clash of civilizations.

The epoch of the emergence of “global society” - global order - should not be reduced to the pro-contra dispute for globalization. The true conflict is about the social nature and the historical form of globalization. What will be the form of globalization? Will it be the one more humane and more socially responsible, or less human and “more profitable” one? Democratic or authoritarian? Therefore, it is of utmost importance that philosophers - given that their views are often seen as value judgments across the humanities - do not go under the established ethical standards of the civilized world and should analyse globalization carefully and be aware of the dilemmas that they may encounter in their professional work. Adequate interdisciplinary approach as well as awareness of responsibility should increase philosophers' sense of responsibility towards the possibilities of philosophy and the significance of its effects.⁴³ After all, the resolution of the conflict about the dominant form of globalization will essentially decide the destiny of billions of people in the world.

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⁴³ For more details see Ž. Kaluđerović, „Bioetičko razmatranje dostignuća savremenih nauka, posebno genetike“, *Godišnjak Filozofskog fakulteta u Novom Sadu* XXXV, no. 1 (2010): 307-318.

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